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BOOK REVIEWS 
Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, ed. by 
Thomas V. Morris. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. 366, $42.50 
(cloth), $13.95 (paper). 
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
The authors in Morris's new collection were commissioned to "treat in some 
manner the theistic conception of God's relation to, and interaction with, the 
created realm." It was hoped that they would explore neglected issues and 
thereby deepen our understanding of theism's metaphysical implications. 
They have succeeded admirably. 
The book is divided into three sections. The first ("Divine Causality and 
the Natural World") contains essays by Linda Zagzebski, Philip Quinn, Alfred 
Freddoso, and Jonathan Kvanvig and Hugh McCann. 
Zagzebski's paper is called "Individual Essence and the Creation." It con-
tains two arguments for the existence of individual essences. The first shows 
that objects can't differ only in accidental properties; they must also differ 
in at least one essential property. There are, then, individual essences. 
Zagzebski's second argument is designed to prove that objects must differ 
not only in qualitative properties (properties "expressible without direct ref-
erence to an individual or a possible world") but also in essential qualitative 
properties. If they do, objects have different individual qualitative essences. 
Both arguments employ a "Principle of Plenitude" which expresses the "sim-
ple intuition" that it is logically possible for an object to have any property 
that isn't excluded by its essential properties, and both appeal to the Identity 
of Indiscernibles. I found Zagzebski's arguments persuasive although her 
second employs the more controversial version of the second principle (that 
distinct objects must have different qualitative properties). She also makes a 
good case for the claim that, by identifying the divine exemplars with indi-
vidual qualitative essences, exemplarism can be defended from several im-
portant objections. 
Philip Quinn ("Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes, and Occasional-
ism") shows that whether natural causation is construed as Humean regular-
ity, counterfactual dependence, or causal necessity, secondary causes are 
consistent with a strong doctrine of divine creation and conservation. Quinn 
avoids occasionalism by stipUlating that God is the total and exclusive caUse 
of a thing's existing at a time but not of its possessing its properties at that 
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time. It is thus possible for (e.g.) a fire being lit at a certain time to be the 
total and exclusive cause of water being heated slightly later although God 
is the total and exclusive cause of the water existing at that later time. Quinn's 
argument is successful on its own terms. Nevertheless, I am bothered by the 
implication that the fire being lit is the "sole cause" of the water being heated, 
and that God's activity isn't "required by way of causal contribution in order 
for the effect to obtain." Doesn't this unduly diminish the range of God's 
sovereignty? I think it does, although (as Quinn points out) it is difficult to 
see how one can avoid this consequence unless one rejects the attractive 
notion that real causes necessitate their effects and aren't redundant, or adopts 
occasionalism. 
Is occasionalism really so absurd? Freddoso's "Medieval Aristotelianism 
and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature" displays the theological 
motives behind it, argues that (in its most coherent form) occasionalism 
denies that created material substances have causal powers, and shows that 
most standard objections to it can easily be met. Freddoso's own objections 
are more formidable. Occasionalism implies that anti-realists are correct. 
Science only describes regularities among phenomena; it doesn't discover 
causes. Freddoso also believes that occasionalism leads to Berkeleyan ideal-
ism since it is difficult to see what a body's metaphysical independence can 
consist in if it lacks causal power. Finally, occasionalism "implicates God 
too deeply in the causation of physical evil." It may also be inconsistent with 
a catholic view of the sacraments. 
I am not completely convinced by these objections. The most unattractive 
feature of anti-realism is its repudiation of a real and independent truth of 
the matter. Occasionalism doesn't do this. Nor is it clear that causal powers 
are a necessary condition of metaphysical independence. Platonisms which 
ascribe independence to numbers, propositions, and values aren't obviously 
incoherent. I also doubt that the "buffer between God and evil" provided by 
created natures matters much. The real issue is responsibility and (as 
Freddoso admits) responsibility isn't diminished by buffers of this sort. 
In "Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World," Kvanvig and 
McCann offer two arguments for the doctrine of divine conservation. The 
first is "based on considerations having to do with the eternity and immuta-
bility of God, and with the nature of the creative act itself." The second 
attempts to show that created things can't have an inherent capacity to sustain 
themselves in existence. Although both are interesting, I found the first less 
persuasive. Kvanvig and McCann argue that since (1) God is immutable, (2) 
"there is simply no room for the claim that He could cease to create, or cease 
to create any of the things He does create." Hence (3) "the world cannot 
persist after God has ceased creating it, for He cannot cease creating it." 
How convincing is this? As the authors point out, one might attempt to 
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avoid the conclusion by arguing "that the primary object of God's creative 
action is not the existence of the world but rather the world's existing at t" 
(the first moment of its existence), for this doesn't entail that God changes. 
While I am not attracted to this view, Kvanvig's and McCann's objections 
to it didn't fully persuade me. Although it is true that the position as stated 
is "saddled" with a controversial presupposition-"namely, that the world 
had a beginning in time," it could be reformulated to avoid it. One could 
stipulate, for example, that the object of God's creative act isn't the existence 
of the world at its first moment of existence but, rather, the existence of each 
substance at its first moment of existence. Nor is it clear that, on this view, 
the objects of God's creative action aren't "substances but complex relational 
states consisting in something's having being at a particular moment." The 
position is surely that God brings about the relational state in creating the 
substance that comes into being at t. Kvanvig and McCann also think that 
the view we are discussing implies that times can "be individuated indepen-
dent of the changes that occur at them" and that this leads to difficulties. God 
would have no reason to bring the world into existence at t rather than at 
some other moment and hence is not "a completely rational being." Since 
there "is a respect in which His activity as Creator is non rational," He isn't 
"perfect in every respect." His immutability also precludes Him from acting 
in this way. An immutable being can't "time the results" of His action by 
"controlling the time" at which He acts since He doesn't act at a time. Nor 
can He do so by "making sure some pre-existent material changes at t," or 
by "doing something to t." Neither objection seems compelling. Suppose 
there is a good reason for doing something (e.g., creating) but not for doing 
it in one way rather than another, and an agent does it in one of these ways. 
How is the agent imperfect? Surely not for being less rational than he or she, 
or some other agent, might have been in those circumstances since it is 
impossible for an agent to act more rationally in those circumstances. Nor do 
I see why God must time the results of His actions by doing something else. 
Why isn't the fact that God eternally wills that the world come into being at 
t sufficient? Given that His will is necessarily efficacious, what else is 
needed? 
The second section is devoted to "Providence and Creaturely Action." Peter 
van Inwagen's paper is called "The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by 
God." He argues that chance may playa major role in a world that God both 
creates and sustains. If it does, many events aren't part of His plan and He 
has no reason for permitting their occurrence (although they may have causes 
and although God may have reasons for permitting events of that type). Van 
Inwagen's thesis is provocative and raises important new issues. In my opin-
ion, van Inwagen has successfully shown that even if God creates and sustains 
the world's basic constituents (elementary particles, Cartesian egos, or what-
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ever) and their causal powers, and even if He foresees everything that tran-
spires, there won't be reasons for some events, or for God's permitting them, 
provided that there is no best possible initial state of the created world, the 
universe is indeterministic, or some creatures enjoy free will. 
John Martin Fischer ("Freedom and Actuality") thinks that theological 
compatibilism has unwelcome consequences. Compatibilists believe that 
even though God foreknows what we will do, we have the power to act 
otherwise. Suppose, for example that God truly believes at t1 that A will do 
x at t3. If A has the power to refrain from doing x at t3, then (1) A at t3 can 
bring it about that God believed at t1 that A would refrain from doing x at 
t3, and (2) can also bring it about that God believed at t2 that A would refrain 
from doing x at t3. The first is incompatible with the "Fixed Past Constraint" 
(that agents don't have the power to perform an action which would make it 
true that individuals who in fact possessed a property prior to their action did 
not possess it). The second is incompatible with one sort of divine immuta-
bility, viz., that if God has a property at a time, no agent can bring it about 
that God doesn't have that property at some later time. Compatibilists are 
willing to accept the first consequence but Fischer believes that some may 
be uneasy about the second. I fail to see why. As he admits, bringing it about 
that God doesn't believe at t2 that A will do x at t3 also brings it about that 
God doesn't believe this at t1 or any other time. The compatibilist isn't 
committed to the possibility that God's beliefs change. Why, then, should 
compatibilists be any more bothered by the fact that agents can bring it about 
that God didn't have a belief at tn which He in fact had at an earlier time 
tn-l (as well as at tn and every other time) than they are by the fact that 
agents can bring it about that God never had the belief He in fact had at tn-l 
(and every other time)? 
The most interesting part of Fischer's paper shows how an indexical 
possibilist like Lewis could avoid both consequences. His argument is, 
roughly, this. Since God's beliefs about what A will do are world indexed, 
God has the same set of beliefs about what A will do in every world in which 
He exists. He believes at every moment, for example, that A does x at t3 in 
world wi, that A refrains from doing x at t3 in w2, etc. Hence, A's refraining 
from doing x at t3 wouldn't bring it about that God had different beliefs about 
what A will do at t3 than those He in fact has. Nor (since God doesn't have 
non-relativised beliefs about which world is actual) would A's refraining from 
doing x at t3 bring it about that God believed that (e.g.) w2 rather than wI 
is actual. As Fischer points out, though, this solution has costs. Apart from 
indexical possibilism's intrinsic implausibility, it is "in contrast with the 
standard theological assumption that God ... made this world the actual world, 
and that He had a good reason for doing so." It also deprives practical 
reasoning of its point. Why should I care whether I do or refrain from doing 
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x if, no matter what I do, worlds in which I do x and worlds in which I don't 
are equally real? 
Thomas Flint's "1\vo Accounts of Providence" provides a very useful anal-
ysis of the Thomists' and Molinists' debate over middle knowledge. It also 
contends that the ultimate source of their disagreement is philosophical, not 
theological. Molinists had a libertarian conception of human freedom while 
Thomists did not. I wasn't entirely convinced by this. Flint is surely right in 
thinking that there is no "credal divergence," and that the issue can't be 
settled by scripture or tradition. It is also true that libertarian conceptions of 
human freedom and orthodox views about God's omniscience make the the-
ory of middle knowledge attractive. It is equally true that compatibilist con-
ceptions of human freedom and orthodox views about God's independence 
and sovereignty make it attractive to suppose that God's knowledge of con-
tingent truths depends on His creative will. Is it clear, though, that the phil-
osophical divergence is more "fundamental" than the theological? Is it clear, 
for example, that strong views about divine sovereignty haven't led at least 
some to reject a libertarian analysis of freedom which would otherwise have 
seemed attractive? Indeed, why isn't it at least as plausible to think that the 
basic issue isn't between philosophical opinions or between theological be-
liefs but between a theological and a philosophical doctrine, i.e., between a 
high doctrine of divine sovereignty which insists on God's complete deter-
mination of contingent facts and an intuitively attractive analysis of human 
freedom? 
William Mann ("God's Freedom, Human Freedom, and God's Responsibil-
ity for Sin") proves that standard views of omnipotence and omniscience and 
the doctrine of simplicity entail that, for any situation that obtains, God 
effectually wills that it obtain and, for any situation that doesn't obtain, God 
effectually wills that it not obtain. Mann envisages three objections to this 
conclusion. It seems to limit God's freedom. (God can't do something we 
can do, viz., "forbear from being decisive about a situation.") It also appears 
inconsistent with human freedom and makes God causally responsible for 
sin. 
Mann's reply to the first objection seems adequate. The "alleged .. .lack of 
an ability on God's part is more accurately described as a lack of a limitation." 
God's inability to forbear from determining whether some state of affairs 
does or doesn't obtain is simply a consequence of His unlimited sovereignty. 
Mann's responses to the other objections are less convincing. He correctly 
points out that his conclusion doesn't entail "Necessarily, I bring it about that 
s" or "Necessarily, I do not exercise the power I have to refrain from bringing 
it about that s," for it isn't necessary that God wills that I bring it about that 
s. This won't provide much comfort to libertarians, however, for the latter 
believe that the power to do otherwise required by human freedom entails 
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the absence of any kind of external determination. Mann's response to the 
third objection is somewhat more persuasive. I agree that God's moral re-
sponsibility in permitting someone to sin is as great as His moral responsi-
bility in effectually willing that that person do so. Mann's position fares no 
worse in this respect than other views. I am not as convinced that the goodness 
of God's purposes and intentions, and His "special status" as "loving creator," 
implies that God doesn't do evil (that good may come) in bringing it about 
that someone sins. (Mann's example of parents knowingly permitting their 
child to do something wrong isn't analogous. In the analogous case, the 
parents would effectually determine the child's sinful intention, desires and 
circumstances.) Contrary to Mann's intentions, his well-reasoned article pro-
vides those of us who hold standard conceptions of omniscience and omnip-
otence, yet find the second and third objections powerful, with one more 
reason for doubting the doctrine of God's simplicity. 
The final section ("The Nature of the Divine Agent") examines a variety 
of topics. In "Divine and Human Action," William Alston amplifies and 
refines a position he has argued for elsewhere: that a functionalist analysis 
of pro-attitudes and beliefs enables us to speak of divine and human action 
in a partially univocal manner. He admits that the resulting concepts of the 
divine psyche and activity are too "thin" for practical or devotional purposes 
but suggests that a solution to this difficulty lies "somewhere in the general 
territory of metaphor and symbol." Alston's thesis is important and should 
interest anyone concerned with the nature of divine action or theological 
predication. 
George Mavrodes ("How Does God Know the Things He Knows?") de-
fends a thesis usually rejected out of hand-that God's knowledge is infer-
ential. Since Mavrodes shows that standard objections to this claim are 
weaker than people have thought, future discussions of the topic must take 
this paper into account. 
Eleonore Stump's and Norman Kretzmann's "Being and Goodness" is a 
rich and interesting discussion of Aquinas's moral theory and of its implica-
tions for theodicy. I will focus on two of their central contentions. (l) If a 
thing's goodness is a function of its being, then the (moral) goodness of a 
human act is a function of what the act is. What it is is determined by its 
"object" ("the state of affairs the agent intends to bring about as a direct effect 
of the action") and its end. An act's goodness, then, is determined solely by 
the value of its end and object; its extrinsic consequences have no bearing 
on its moral quality. (2) One treats an innocent unjustly if he or she is made 
to suffer without fair compensation. Taking an innocent's life, for example, 
is unjust because "a necessary ... condition of its being rational ["to take 
another's worldly goods"] is its involving an even trade," and the innocent 
whose life is taken receives nothing in return. One is never justified in per-
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mitting innocents to suffer in order to obtain a greater good. While the act's 
end is good, its object is not and hence the act itself is morally defective. 
God cannot, then, justly permit uncompensated suffering to secure the good 
of others. Nor is it enough that He provide compensation which is accepted 
as adequate by the victim or that there be "an essential rather than a merely 
accidental connection between the suffering and the compensation." The 
suffering must be such that without it "greater harm would come to the 
victim." Greater good theodicies typically ignore this requirement and are 
therefore inadequate. 
Neither contention is fully persuasive. Consequentialist intuitions are 
stronger than the authors seem willing to allow. Common sense morality 
doesn't believe that an actions (intended and foreseen) consequences are 
always (or perhaps even usually) decisive. But it does appear to think that, 
in cases in which the foreseen consequences of refraining from an act that 
would otherwise be wrong (one with a bad object, for example) are over-
whelmingly bad, it is permissible to perform it and may even be morally 
wrong not to do so. I think Charles Larmore is right. We have deontological 
and consequentialist intuitions. Both should be respected, and they sometimes 
conflict. l (Whether the conflict is a reflection of our fallen situation is an 
interesting question.) If Larmore is right, theories which entail that (foreseen) 
"extrinsic" consequences can't have a bearing on the moral quality of a 
person's act are mistaken. But theories like Aquinas's are attractive for a 
number of reasons not the least of which is the way they embed ethics in a 
rich theistic metaphysics. Could a theory of this sort accommodate con-
sequentialist intuitions without being altered beyond recognition? A meta-
physics of being and goodness may entail that an act's moral value is 
determined by its intrinsic nature, i.e., by what the act is. It is less obvious 
that an act's intrinsic nature is solely determined by its object and end and 
not also by its foreseen consequences and the foreseen consequences of 
refraining from it (including those that depend on how other agents will 
probably behave). It isn't obvious, in other words, that these consequences 
are "extrinsic accidents" of the act. A particular act is partly defined by its 
motivational structure and foreseen consequences are part of this structure. 
If intrinsic accidents are what "clarify and redefine our understanding of 
what" an agent does, it is difficult to see why foreseen consequences aren't 
intrinsic. 
I am also unpersuaded by the authors' second contention. It is true that 
God's justice requires that He compensate those whose innocent suffering He 
permits. It is also true that it isn't enough for a victim to find compensation 
adequate since it may not be. But the example from A Tale of Two Cities 
which the authors use to make this point is misleading. While a few gold 
coins may satisfy the parents whose child has been run over, they are clearly 
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disproportionate to the loss of a child's life. Suppose, however, that the 
compensation is an everlasting participation in God's own life. Marilyn 
Adams has argued that this good is incommensurable with any finite evil. Be 
this as it may, it surely isn't disproportionate to it. But if innocent victims 
can be compensated with a good which isn't disproportionate to their suffer-
ing (and may even be incommensurable with it), and if (as I argued in the 
preceding paragraph) "extrinsic~' consequences are sometimes relevant to the 
moral quality of a person's act, I fail to see why God couldn't be justified in 
permitting someone's suffering when doing so is necessary to secure the 
greater good of others. 
Keith Yandell's paper on "Divine Necessity and Divine Goodness" is very 
interesting and highly controversial. His argument is roughly this. (1) Jesus 
could be tempted only if He was able to act wrongly. (2) If it was logically 
impossible for Jesus to sin, He wasn't able to act wrongly. (3) If God is 
essentially divine and exists necessarily, it is logically impossible for God to 
act wrongly. (4) God is essentially divine. (5) Jesus is God. (6) If God exists 
necessarily, it was logically impossible for Jesus to sin. (From 3, 4, and 5.) 
(7) Jesus was tempted. Therefore, (8) God doesn't exist necessarily. (From 
1, 2, 6, and 7.) Yandell concludes that "plain theism" which believes that 
God's existence is contingent should be preferred to Anselmian theism which 
does not. 
Several comments are in order. (1) While being tempted to do x may entail 
thinking one can do it, does it entail being able to do it? Although Yandell 
thinks 1 is necessary, he doesn't provide an argument for it. 1 isn't really 
needed, however, for not only is 7 true, it is also true that Jesus was a 
responsible moral agent. If Yandell is right, being a responsible moral agent 
entails an ability to act wrongly. (2) Is he right? Yandell argues that a person 
whose nature or circumstances are so constructed that he or she can't act 
wrongly isn't a responsible moral agent. The person's goodness isn't 
"earned," and his or her "freedom would range over too little territory." This 
seems correct. But what appears to be crucial in these cases is a lack of 
autonomy (the fact that the person's actions are ultimately produced by the 
extrinsic causes responsible for his or her nature or circumstances) and a lack 
of significant freedom (the comparative triviality of the agent's choices). 
Neither is true of God (and hence of the incarnate Logos). God's actions 
aren't produced by extrinsic causes and the range of God's freedom (the 
creation of any world it wouldn't be wrong to produce) is hardly insignificant. 
(3) Yandell's "plain theism" leads to the same problems he discovers in 
Anselmian theism. 
Even though goodness is included in God's essence, God can sin although, 
if He "should sin, He would ... commit deicide-cease to be altogether." Does 
this imply that God isn't essentially eternal (and that a belief firmly rooted 
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in classical Christianity is therefore false)? To show that it doesn't, Yandell 
constructs the following argument. (1) If God exists, God now knows whether 
He will choose to sin or not. (2) If He knows that He won't sin, He won't 
and "so deicide does not occur." (3) If He knows that He will sin, then He 
also knows that He sins in the future and does nothing now to prevent it. (4) 
If He knows that He sins in the future and does nothing now to prevent it, 
He "is not morally perfect even now, and so has committed deicide already" 
(which is impossible). Hence, (5) If God exists, He never commits deicide. 
Given that (6) no other being can "surprise" or "overcome" Him, and so 
destroy Him, it follows that (7) God is indestructible. Therefore, (8) "if God 
ever exists, He always exists." But this won't do; for if the argument is valid, 
its premises also entail that God can't sin. Since Yandell thinks 8 is neces-
sarily true, he must also think his premises are necessarily true. Since his 
premises are necessarily true, 5 is necessarily true. There is no possible world 
in which God exists and commits deicide. God, therefore, can't commit 
deicide. But sinning and deicide are logically coextensive. If God sins He 
commits deicide and (since "deicide would be wrong") if God commits dei-
cide, he sins. Hence God, and thus the incarnate Logos, can't sin. If He can't, 
then (on Yandell's view), Jesus isn't a responsible moral agent. "Plain the-
ism" turns out to have no advantage over Anselmian theism. 
I am enthusiastic about this collection. All of the essays are good and some 
are outstanding. Anyone with an interest in philosophical theology should 
read it. 
NOTES 
l. Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987. 
Eternal God, by Paul Helm. NY: Oxford University Press, 1988. Pp. xv + 
228, $34.95. 
BRIAN LEFTOW, Fordham University 
The Western monotheisms agree that God is eternal. But their philosophers 
disagree about what eternality is. While most now think that God's eternality 
is His existing through all time, virtually all thinkers up to Aquinas' day held 
that God's eternity is His existing timelessly-i.e., existing, but existing 
neither before, after, nor at the same time as any temporal event. As Paul 
Helm understands this doctrine of timeless eternity (DTE), a timeless God is 
to time as an author is to the time-frame of that author's novel (30-31): in 
